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Abstract
Display advertisements on the web are sold via ad exchanges that use real time
auction. We describe the challenges of designing a suitable auction, and present a
simple auction called the Optional Second Price (OSP) auction that is currently used
in Doubleclick Ad Exchange.
1 Introduction to Web Display Ads
Web is a pervasive entity: millions of publishers produce content and configure webpages;
hundreds of millions of users worldwide browse the web every day and access these pages; as
a result, web has become a powerful communication medium. Its economics is predominantly
driven by advertisers who wish to get the attention of the users using the publishers as the
channel for placing advertisements (ads) on the pages. Where in the webpage and how
many ads are shown are determined by the publisher of the page. Which ads are shown is
determined by offline negotiation between sales teams of publishers and advertisers, perhaps
via intermediaries like ad agencies and networks. How these ads are actually delivered from
advertiser to the web user is achieved by ad delivery systems that are sophisticated computer
and overlay communication systems on the Internet. Payment depends on whatever sales
teams negotiate, and may vary from advertiser to advertiser to reach the same user at the
same page. There is little transparency.
An emerging way of selling and buying ads on the Internet is via an exchange that brings
sellers (publishers) and buyers (advertisers) together to a common, automatic marketplace.
There are exchanges in the world for trading financial securities to currency, physical goods,
virtual credits, and much more. Exchanges serve many purposes from bringing efficiency,
to eliciting prices, generating capital, aggregating information etc. Ad exchanges are recent.
RightMedia [3], adBrite [5], OpenX [4], and DoubleClick [2] are examples.
• Publishers expect to get the best price from the exchange, better than from any specific
ad network; in addition, publishers get liquidity.
• Advertisers get access to a large inventory at the exchange, and in addition, the ability
to target more precisely across web pages.
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• Finally, the exchange is a clearing house ensuring the flow of money.
In many ways, these ad exchanges are modeled after financial stock exchanges. Since 2005
when RightMedia appeared, ad exchanges have become popular. In Sept 2009, RightMedia
averaged 9 billion transactions a day with 100’s of thousands of buyers and sellers. Dou-
bleClick’s ad exchange has been active since 2009. It seems ad exchanges are likely to become
a major platform for trading ads.
2 How Ad Exchanges Work
There are several key decisions that ultimately determine the architecture of ad exchanges:
these decisions include, for example, what goods should be traded, what should be the re-
lationship among ad networks that exchanges endogenize, what are informational interfaces
including bids, minimum prices, and winner/loser notification, and what are the contracts
between the exchange and publishers or ad networks etc. For example, what commodities
should be traded? One can imagine trading contracts for bulk impressions (eg., 1M im-
pressions per day in YouTube homepage for a movie trailer). Instead, ad exchanges trade
individual impressions. More sophisticated contracts can be crafted on top of this spot
market. Another issue is who will be the participants in the market? Much like financial
exchanges that only let licensed brokers trade, ad exchanges let ad networks trade on the
exchange on behalf on individual advertisers.
The AdX model in [10] is an abstraction of ad exchanges. We describe it here in a suitable
form as the basis for our discussions (more details can be found in [10]). It is defined as a
sequence of events.
1. User u visits the webpage w of publisher p(w) that has, say, a single slot for ads.
2. Publisher p(w) contacts the exchange E with (w,P (u), ρ) where ρ is the minimum
price p(w) is willing to take for the slot in w, and P (u) is the information about user
u that P (w) shares with E.
3. The exchange E contacts ad networks a1, . . . , am with (E(w), E(u)), where E(w) is
information about w provided by E, and E(u) is the information about u provided by
E. E() may be potentially different from P (u).
4. Each ad network ai returns (bi, di) on behalf of its customers which are the advertisers;
bi is its bid, that is, the maximum it is willing to pay for the slot in page w and di is
the ad it wishes to be shown. The ad networks may also choose not to return a bid.
5. Exchange E determines a winner i∗ for the ad slot among all (bi, di)’s and its price ci∗ ,
ρ ≤ ci∗ ≤ bi∗ via an auction. This auction will discussed in detail later.
6. Exchange E returns winning ad di∗ to p(w) and price ci∗ to i
∗.
7. The publisher p(w) serves webpage w with ad di∗ to user u. This is known as an
impression of ad di∗ .
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Figure 1: AdX
The flow is shown in Figure 1. It is important for our discussion to realize that the entire
flow occurs between the time u requests page w, and w is shown to the user. Hence, the
process needs to take a few 100 msec and no longer. Second, potentially, every view on the
Internet may generate a call to the Exchange, so potentially 10’s of billions of transactions
may result in the Exchange in a day. Finally, Exchanges are potentially the gateway for the
Billions of dollars of the display ads Economy that underpins the Web, and they modulate
the flow from millions of advertisers to millions of content generators. As a result, there are
many high performance engineering requirements of the Exchange and optimizations, which
we do not address here. Also, there are significant reasons for the various informational
interfaces provided in the Exchange which we do not discuss here [10].
3 The Problem of Auctions at AdX
At the core of AdX is an auction to determine the winner for the impression of an ad. There
are potentially other auctions, in some cases, at the publisher or at the ad networks to
determine the winner and bidders resp. which we do not directly emphasize here. The AdX
auction governs the short term revenues of three parties directly:
• the publisher: higher price translates directly to higher revenue,
• the ad exchange: higher price potentially leads to higher commissions for transacting,
and
• perhaps surprisingly, even the ad networks: higher price leads to potentially higher
commissions for handling ad campaigns on behalf of advertisers.
There are also long term revenue concerns. Making the auction more efficient, incentive-
compatible, transparent, stable and fair will ultimately increase the adoption of this ad
market by buyers and sellers and increase revenues long term.
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At a high level, the auction problem at the exchange seems the simple case of single item
auction. Decades of research in Auction Theory [9] have identified efficient (VCG) auctions,
Myerson’s revenue-optimal auctions [11], 1 and developed a structural theory of equivalence
between certain auction types for single item auctions. On closer inspection, the auction
problem at AdX is not simple. Here are two example issues:
• Intermediaries. Intermediaries on buy (and also sell) side influence the information
available to the auctioneer and distort the market. As an example, say Network 1 has
two advertisers who bid 10 and 8; Network 2 has one advertiser with bid 5. From
the description above, it will follow that AdX only sees bids 10 and 5 and hence,
Network 1 wins the good at price 5, while it can charge 8 to its top bidder using
second price! The observation is that due to the presence of networks, AdX does not
have the full information and can not implement true second price on the entire book
of bids. Further, the exchange loses information about all the bids, and hence, loses
the ability to shift the potential revenue away from the networks if so desired. Readers
can imagine other auctions at the exchange and realize that this problem persists when
networks strategize.
• Alternative Channels. Publishers set min price ρ to optimize their revenue and other
considerations. On top of that, it is expected that AdX should impose additional
reserve price as Myerson’s theory [11] will indicate in order to maximize its revenue.
In a simple formulation of this problem [8], it is shown that this reserve will tend to 0
as number of intermediaries increases, but the theory is unclear about the impact of a
reserve price at AdX. If AdX imposes its additional reserve price, the goods will remain
unsold by AdX for a fraction of the times it would have sold otherwise. Hence, its fill
rate, that is, the percentage of times it returns an ad to the publisher will go down.
This is an important metric of the health of AdX and if fill rate declines, the publisher
may choose not to come to AdX or fill using alternative sales channels. Thus, AdX
may not realistically be able to strategize and compete against alternative channels if
they wanted to ensue a vibrant market.
Therefore, auction design at AdX is a challenge.
4 Our Auction Solution
One option is for the AdX to adopt first price aucton. Observe that this is implementable
truly in AdX in presence of networks because no information about any bid other than
the highest bid at any network is needed to implement it. However, first price auction, even
without intermediaries, has well known strategic problems of instability. Thus, it is desirable
to keep the second price logic. How to enforce it is a difficult business decision. One approach
is to change the bidding language and ask each network to reveal the entire book of bids,
but networks can strategize and invalidate this approach. One might even consider using
legal contracts to make networks comply. This will be a big business hurdle, and jeopardize
the adaptation of AdX. AdX might reveal the winning price to end advertisers for each
1Both of these auctions have been recognized with Nobel prizes.
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impression (bypassing the networks) and thereby shift the savings to them. This does not
satisfy the publishers by getting the second price revenue from the entire book of bids and
additionally this alienates the networks which are formidable players in this ecosystem.
Our final solution is exceedingly simple, as indeed it needs to be given performance
constraints.
• Each network i that participates submits mandatory bid bi and an optional bid oi ≤ bi
(which could be 0).
• AdX runs a second price auction, using publisher-specified ρ as the reserve price, and
charges winner i, max{maxj 6=i bj, oi, ρ}.
We call this the Optional Second Price (OSP) Auction.
5 Properties of the OSP Auction
The OSP auction represents many business decisions. First, we ignore short term revenue
of AdX and do not introduce any reserve price on top of publisher specified ρ. We let
publishers control their revenue with min price ρ that they strategize, exogenous to AdX.
We rejected disruptive solutions like making prices public after each auction to advertisers,
and let networks handle relationships with advertisers. This in particular would mean,
scenario above of a network winning a good at 5 for 10 bid is feasible. Networks are an
important part of the display ads business: in some cases, they produce content and plan
campaign smartly, and are already entrenched in the ecosystems. So, AdX auction lets them
implement their strategic goals, no matter if it is not a true second price auction at the AdX.
On the other hand, the OSP auction has certain desirable properties:
Property P1. If a network i, wishes to simulate second price auction among its bidders,
it can do so using the optional bid oi by correctly specifying the second highest bid among
its bidders as oi (= 8 in the example). In this case, from the point of view of all its bidders,
the OSP auction is completely indistinguishable from a true second price auction. This is
true whether or not any of the other networks send the correct second bid. Thus, honest
second price networks can simulate their business with little overhead. In the absence of
this feature, networks that have contractual obligation with their bidders to run a second
price auction (such as Google’s Adwords network) will have to significantly modify their
logging and billing system to correctly track the spend. Further, they will have to explain
to their customer with the second highest bid why they did not win the impression that was
sold at a price lower than their bid. Thus their business as well as technology problems are
immediately solved by using the optional bid feature honestly.
Property P2. There are other possible options for a networks i regarding the auction it
implements among its bidders. Here are some natural ones: (1 ) It can declare and simulate a
second price auction to its bidders, pocketing the difference (maxk bik)−(maxj 6=i bj) whenever
it controls both the highest and second highest bids, where bik ’s denote the bids of its
bidders. In this case, from the point of view of all its bidders, the OSP auction is still
indistinguishbable from a true second price auction, and strategic bidders will be truthful.
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(2) It may choose to give back all the savings to the bidders, i.e. charge its winning bidders
the price of maxj 6=i bj. This is similar to a bidding club, and in this case strategic bidders
should not be truthful but rather will tend to over-bid. Underbidding is weakly dominated by
truth. (3) It may charge a fixed price of its choice from all its bidders, rather than conducting
an auction (this is a common strategy for ad networks). In this case only impressions where
this fixed price is higher than maxj 6=i bj will be sold to the nework’s bidders and some network
policy must dictate who wins in case of multiple advertisers that are willing to pay the fixed
price. (4) A first price auction among it’s bidders is a possibility, in which case maxj 6=i bj
serves as a reserve price, and we expect strategic bidders to slightly underbid.
Property P3. The expected gain of a network from not reporting the correct second price
which is equal to the expected loss of the publisher is small, as long as the network is not
too large a fraction of the market. We will present a simple analysis to quantify how much
lying about the optional bid profits a network that pretends to be a second price auction
and pockets the difference – the first option above2. Say there are k networks, k ≥ 2, and
bidders with arbitrary bids d1 ≥ . . . ≥ dn are independently, uniformly, randomly assigned
to the networks. Say network 1 has the highest bid d1. There are two cases.
• Network 1 is truthful about o1 where o1 is the second highest bid among bidders as-
signed to network 1, that is, o1 = maxk b1k . All networks are truthful about mandatory
bid bi’s. It is immediate that price of 1 is d2, no matter the assignment of bidders to
networks.
• Network 1 is not truthful about o1. Then, its price is d2 if the bidder with bid d2
was represented by one of the networks other than 1 which happens with probability
1− 1/k; its price is d3 if d2 is assigned to network 1 and d3 is assigned to one of other
networks, which happens with probability (1/k)(1−1/k); continuing like this, network
1’s price is dj with probability (1/k
j−2)(1− 1/k). In other words the gain of network
1 is
n∑
j=2
dj
kj−2
(
1− 1
k
)
− d2 =
n∑
i=1
di+2 − di+1
ki
,
and this is the publisher’s loss.
We can first observe that for any values of the di’s the loss of the publisher is bounded
from above by d2/k, which is a loss of at most 1/k fraction of the revenue that would
have been obtained with the correct reporting of the second price. This is the loss
conditioned on winning network not reporting the second price correctly. When t out
of the k networks do not report their second price correctly, and the bidders choosing
between them uniformly, then the expected loss, is at most t/k2 fraction of revenue.
The analysis above holds for any values of the di’s, and is tight only when d3 = d4 =
... = dn = 0. Let us consider a more typical scenario, where the di’s are, e.g., chosen
uniformly at random in [0, 1]. In this case, the expected value of d2 is 1 − 2/(n + 1)
and the expected value of di+2 − di+1 is 1/(n+ 1). It follows that the expected loss if
2This will also be an upper bound on the gains of the bidders of a network that passes on the gains to
them – the second option – as in this case strategic bidders never underbid.
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the wining network lies is
n∑
i=1
1
(n+ 1)ki
,
which is O(1/(kn)) fraction of the revenue.
The analyses above assume the bidders do not differentiate among networks. We leave it
open to analyze the OSP auction under more sophisticated models of how bidders gravitate
towards different networks (eg., a good model might be proportional where bidders join
networks with probability proportional to their current size).
6 Use of the OSP Auction
Google’s DoubleClick Ad Exchange uses our OSP auction [7]. It has been operational world-
wide since Sept 2009. The number of transactions at this exchange (ie, transactions that
use our auction) exceeds the number of transactions at financial exchanges worldwide and
this is a conservative benchmark. Discussion of a year of experience with this exchange is in
Google blog [6]. Our optional bid feature is being used (among other things) to let Google’s
Adwords network bid via Ad Exchange [7], where this feature is used to simulate AdWord’s
native second price auction seamlessly, without additional effort. This is crucially due to
property P1 above. It is rare that three of us researchers were involved at the beginning
when DoubleClick Ad Exchange was built, and had the opportunity to impact the auction.
7 Concluding Remarks
AdX makes the well-trenched display ads business based on offline negotiations, to be more
automatic, market-driven and sustains a very large ecosystem on buy and sell sides. We
have demonstrated that even in single item auction as it arises in AdX, there are nontrivial
design issues due to the presence of intermediary networks. We have proposed the Optional
Second Price (OSP) auction which has desirable nuances and is currently used in AdX.
References
[1] Whitepaper at http://www.adecn.com/resources/
ATrueExchangeforOnlineAdvertising.pdf. In http: // www. adecn. com/ .
[2] Overview at www.google.com/adexchange/AdExchangeOverview.pdf, product in-
formation at http://www.doubleclick.com/products/advertisingexchange/index.
aspx. In http: // www. doubleclick. com .
[3] http://www.rightmedia.com/right-media-101/. In http: // www. rightmedia.
com/ .
[4] OpenX http://www.openx.com/
7
[5] adBrite http://www.adbrite.com/
[6] A year of new doubleclick ad exchange. http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/
year-of-new-doubleclick-ad-exchange.html
[7] How the DoubleClick Ad Exchange auction works. http://adwords.google.com/
support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=146606
[8] J. Feldman, V. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan and M. Pai. Auctions with intermediaries.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2010, 23–32.
[9] V. Krishna Auction Theory. Elsevier Inc. 2003.
[10] S. Muthukrishnan. Ad exchanges: Research issues. In Proc. WINE. LNCS, New York,
1–12.
[11] Roger B. Myerson Optimal Auction Design In Mathematics of Operations Research,
Vol. 6, No. 1 (Feb., 1981), pp. 58-73
8
